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We reviewed reports to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention of US travelers suspected of having
avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection from February
2003 through May 2006. Among the 59 reported patients,
no evidence of H5N1 virus infection was found; none had
direct contact with poultry, but 42% had evidence of human
influenza A.
A
s of June 2006, the epizootic of highly pathogenic
avian influenza A (H5N1) virus among birds had
spread to 3 continents (1). Sporadic human H5N1 cases
characterized by severe respiratory disease with high case-
fatality have been reported in 10 countries: Azerbaijan,
Cambodia, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, People’s
Republic of China, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam (2).
Investigations have implicated direct contact with diseased
poultry as the primary risk factor for H5N1 virus infection
(3,4).
To date, highly pathogenic H5N1 virus infections
among poultry or wild birds in the United States have not
been identified. However, US residents may be exposed if
they travel to H5N1-affected countries. In February 2003,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
developed interim guidance for testing of suspected cases
of H5N1 in returned travelers (5). CDC revised the recom-
mendations in February 2004 (6). We report the results of
investigations of patients with suspected H5N1 that were
reported to CDC from February 2003 through May 2006.
The Study
We retrospectively analyzed available data on US
patients with suspected H5N1 virus infection that were
reported to CDC by clinicians and public health depart-
ments from February 2003 through May 2006. Clinical
and epidemiologic data about reported patients were com-
municated to CDC by telephone, email, and/or fax. For
each patient, we assessed whether criteria for recommend-
ed H5N1 testing were met (suspected H5N1 case defini-
tion). The suspected H5N1 case definition had 2
components: the hospitalized case definition included
severe respiratory illness and recent travel to an H5N1-
affected country; and the ambulatory case definition
included acute respiratory illness, contact with domestic
poultry or a known or suspected H5N1 case-patient, and
recent travel to an H5N1-affected country (6) (Figure).
Contact was defined as proximity <1 m, and direct contact
was defined as physical touching.
If a patient met the suspected H5N1 case definition, or
if exposure data were incomplete and clinicians or public
health authorities had persistent concerns, H5N1-specific
testing was recommended by CDC. A standard case report
form was completed by state health departments.
Diagnostic testing for patients with suspected H5N1
virus infection was performed at CDC, state laboratories,
or both. Procedures for reverse transcription–PCR (RT-
PCR) and microneutralization assay for H5N1 have been
previously described (7,8). Epidemiologic and laboratory
data were analyzed by using EpiInfo version 3.3.2 (CDC,
Atlanta, GA, USA).
Fifty-nine patients from 26 states were reported to
CDC for suspicion of H5N1 virus infection from February
2003 through May 2006 (Table and Figure). Nineteen
(37%) were male (n = 52), and the median age was 47
years (n = 49, range 2–87 years). Of the samples received
from 37 patients that were tested at CDC, none had evi-
dence of H5N1 virus infection. CDC tested samples from
8 patients for human influenza Aonly, and 5 were positive.
Among the samples from 22 (37%) patients not tested at
CDC, 4 (7%) were tested for H5N1 at state public health
laboratories, and all were negative. Of the remaining 18
(31%) patients, 15 were not tested for H5N1 and state test-
ing data were unavailable for 3 (Figure).
On the basis of available information, 27 (46%)
patients met the CDC suspected H5N1 case definition
(Table). Fourteen (24%) had severe, acute respiratory ill-
ness with recent travel to an H5N1-affected country.
Overall, 25 (42%) patients, including 2 of 4 who died, test-
ed positive for human influenza A virus infection. In addi-
tion, 52% of the 27 patients who met the CDC suspected
H5N1 case definition had samples that tested positive for
human influenza A. Four influenza A cases occurred out-
side the US influenza season. Of the influenza A–positive
patients, 10 had H3N2 viral isolates that were character-
ized at CDC. All isolates were similar to human influenza
A virus strains concurrently circulating in North America.
Other diagnoses included community-acquired pneu-
monia, bronchiolitis obliterans and organizing pneumonia,
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(Table). Among 28 patients without a diagnosis, 8 (29%)
tested negative for influenza but had influenzalike illness
and contact with an influenza A (H3)–positive person.
Among all reported patients, 52 (88%) had traveled to
>1 of 11 countries in Asia with either confirmed human
H5N1 cases or H5N1 in avian species before illness onset
(Table). Four (7%) patients with suspected H5N1 virus
infection had not traveled outside the United States, but
they had contact with recent travelers to Asia, and 1 had
traveled to a country without confirmed H5N1 in poultry
or wild birds. Although 14 (24%) reported having been
within <1 m of any live poultry or domesticated birds in
Asia, none reported touching live poultry, domesticated
birds, or recently butchered poultry. No patients with sus-
pected H5N1 virus infection had contact with any con-
firmed or suspected human H5N1 case-patients.
Conclusions
Our review of patients evaluated for H5N1 virus
infection among returned US travelers through May 2006
indicates that the risk of H5N1 to US travelers has been
extremely low to date. A high proportion of the reported
patients had evidence of human influenza A virus infec-
tion, but none tested positive for H5N1. Although direct
contact with infected poultry is the primary risk factor for
H5N1 virus infection (3,4), H5N1 virus transmission has
been low, even among persons directly exposed to poultry
suspected of infection with currently circulating H5N1
virus strains (9,10). None of the patients reported to CDC
had touched poultry, and 48% of persons with cases that
met the CDC suspected H5N1 case definition had not been
within <1 m of birds during travel.
Our finding that 42% of patient with suspected H5N1
virus infection had human influenza A emphasizes the
importance of considering this disease year-round in
returned travelers with acute respiratory infections. Human
influenza activity in tropical and subtropical countries
occurs year-round outside the typical US influenza season
(11) and is the most frequent vaccine-preventable infection
among travelers from Europe to tropical and subtropical
countries (12). Moreover, the effect of influenza disease in
tropical countries is substantial; for example, rates of
influenza-associated hospitalizations in subtropical Hong
Kong approximate US estimates (13).
Annual influenza vaccination is the best way to pre-
vent human influenza. Influenza vaccine effectiveness
depends upon multiple factors, including the degree of
similarity between the vaccine strains and those in circula-
tion. Persons at high risk for complications from influenza
who were not vaccinated during the preceding fall or win-
ter should consider influenza vaccination, if available,
before travel (14). However, no human H5N1 vaccine is
currently available.
Our study is subject to several limitations. The report-
ed patients may not be representative of all US travelers at
risk for H5N1 virus infection among whom respiratory ill-
ness developed, but were persons for whom health depart-
ments and physicians sought CDC consultation. States
may have evaluated travelers for H5N1 virus infection
without notifying CDC. Additionally, some reported
patients were not tested for H5N1 if available epidemio-
logic and clinical information suggested that H5N1 virus
infection was unlikely. Clinical charts were not
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laboratory data were limited to that sent to CDC by state
and local health departments. In many instances, the role
of CDC was to exclude the diagnosis of H5N1, and further
testing to establish a diagnosis other than influenza was not
always performed.
Continued surveillance and testing for H5N1 is war-
ranted, given the current H5N1 epizootic, the ongoing
occurrence of human H5N1 cases globally, and the impor-
tance of identifying influenza A viruses with pandemic
potential in the United States as early as possible. In 2006,
CDC and WHO revised their definitions for suspected
H5N1 cases (15,16). The revised CDC suspected H5N1
case definition now specifically requires that case patients
have touched poultry or have had contact with a patient
with confirmed or suspected H5N1 virus infection. It also
more clearly defines an H5N1-affected country. The find-
ings of our study support these changes. Guidance for the
evaluation of patients with suspected H5N1 virus infection
should continue to be evaluated as more epidemiologic
data become available.
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Figure. Influenza testing of suspected US cases of avian influenza
A (H5N1) reported to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) from February 2003 through May 2006. *Of the
37 samples tested by CDC, 35 were respiratory samples, 1 was
serum, and 1 was a lung specimen. All 35 respiratory samples
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scription-PCR, and the serum sample was tested by microneutral-
ization assay. †CDC suspected H5N1 case definition, February 2,
2004–June 7, 2006 (6): a patient is hospitalized and has radi-
ographically confirmed pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syn-
drome, or other severe respiratory illness for which an alternate
diagnosis has not been established; and the patient has a history
of travel within 10 days of symptom onset to a country with docu-
mented H5N1 avian influenza in poultry and/or humans; or a
patient is hospitalized or ambulatory and has a documented tem-
perature >38°C (>100.4°F); and has a cough, sore throat, or short-
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and obliterans organizing pneumonia; TSS, toxic shock syndrome.15.  World Health Organization. WHO case definitions for human infec-
tions with influenza A(H5N1) virus. 2006. [cited 2006 Aug 30].
Available from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/
guidelines/case_definition2006_08_29/en/index.html
16.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Updated interim guid-
ance for laboratory testing of persons with suspected infection with
avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in the United States. 2006. [cited
2006 Nov 4]. Available from http://www2a.cdc.gov/han/
ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=00246
Address for correspondence: Justin R. Ortiz, Influenza Division, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop A32,
Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; email: dzv3@cdc.gov
No Evidence of H5N1 among Returning US Travelers
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 2, February 2007 297
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do
not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention or the institutions with which the authors
are affiliated.
Search
past issues